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Abstract 
In its Chagos Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled 
that the UK’s detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from the colony of 
Mauritius on the eve of independence constituted a violation of customary 
international law (CIL). This article analyses the Court’s approach to 
establishing the emergence and content of the right to self-determination in this 
frustrated case of decolonization. It goes on to examine the argument that self-
determination’s peremptory character has decisive consequences in this 
specific context – a contention which found favour with several judges in their 
Separate Opinions. The article explores the extent to which the claims and 
counterclaims, made during the advisory proceedings, turned on countervailing 
readings of not only the key sources of custom but also of the principle of inter-
temporal law. The final sections consider the significance of the Chagos 
Opinion for the Chagossians, both in relation to the Archipelago’s resettlement 
and for their outstanding appeal in the UK courts (where the European 
Convention on Human Rights performs a pivotal role). 
Key words: Self-determination; customary international law, decolonization, jus 
cogens, European Convention on Human Rights.  
1. Introduction
In its Chagos Advisory Opinion,1 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the
detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius before it acceded to
independence constituted a violation of customary international law (CIL). In arriving
at this conclusion, the Court offered a thorough re-evaluation of the status and content
of right to self-determination and its relationship with the norms governing territoriality
in the context of decolonization. In particular, it established how, and when, self-
determination became a CIL rule as well as confirming the manner in which this
entitlement could be exercised. Further, in their Separate Opinions, several judges
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endorsed the claim – advanced by a number of the participants in the advisory 
proceedings – that self-determination had become a peremptory norm of international 
law in the critical period. This article assesses the resonance of these arguments and 
findings for the jurisprudence of self-determination and for the related norms which 
evolved to protect the territorial integrity of colonial units and newly independent 
States. It, therefore, concentrates on substantive aspects concerning the emergence 
and content of the CIL relating to self-determination, rather than the procedural issues 
raised by the case.2 In a companion article, Robert McCorquodale Jennifer Robinson 
and Nicola Peart examine the significance of the Chagos Opinion for instances of 
decolonization which threatened to disrupt the territorial integrity of established 
colonial units and the role that consent plays in such cases. The present contribution 
also assesses the Opinion’s resonance for the Chagossians as it is not entirely clear 
how the rights and interests of this deracinated community will be protected in the 
event of the Archipelago’s resettlement. The article then turns to consider the way in 
which the Opinion can be harnessed for Chagossians’ current appeal in the UK courts 
via the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
2. Background 
It was feared that the UK’s planned colonial withdrawal from the Indian Ocean would 
create a regional power vacuum, which might be filled by the Soviet Union.3 
Consequently, a 1964 UK/US survey of the Indian Ocean revealed that Diego Garcia, 
the principal island in the remote Chagos Archipelago, would make an ideal site for a 
US military base. This inhabited Archipelago was a distant dependency of the British 
Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT) of Mauritius.4 In 1965, the UK government 
entered into the ‘Lancaster House Agreement’ with the Mauritian Council of Ministers 
to detach the Chagos Islands from Mauritius before it acceded to independence.5 The 
historical record shows the UK government applied considerable pressure to procure 
such ‘consent’ and that this transaction was intimately connected with the decision to 
 
2 The Court ruled, unanimously, that it had jurisdiction to give an Advisory Opinion in accordance with 
Art 65, UN Charter. It decided that it should not decline to answer the Request (12 votes to 2). 
3 See David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the US Military Base on Diego Garcia (2009). 
Stephen Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law (2014); and Stephen Allen and Chris 
Monaghan (eds), Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives (2018).  
4 Mauritius was listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory in GA Res 66(I)(1946). 
5 See Chagos Advisory Opinion (n 1) [108-112].  
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grant Mauritius its independence.6 The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) was 
created in 1965 and the Chagos Islands were separated from Mauritius accordingly.7 
It was set aside for defence purposes and, in 1966, the UK and US concluded a treaty 
regarding the use of Diego Garcia.8 Between 1968 and 1973, the Archipelago’s 
permanent inhabitants – the Chagossians – were forcibly removed from the entire 
Archipelago and/or prohibited from returning pursuant to the construction and 
operation of the planned US military facility.9 Through the 1965 ‘Agreement’, the UK 
government undertook, inter alia, to return the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius once 
it was no longer required for defence purposes.  
Since 1980s, the Mauritian government has demanded the return of the 
Archipelago on the ground that the Mauritian colonial government’s consent to the 
1965 ‘Agreement’ was vitiated by duress.10 In 2010, it instituted proceedings, under 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in response to the UK’s declaration of a 
vast Marine Protected Area (MPA) around the Chagos Archipelago.11 Mauritius 
asserted its sovereignty claim in this case but the Tribunal ruled it lacked the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate this contention.12 Nevertheless, Judges Kateka and Wolfrum 
found that the right of self-determination had entered into custom by the time of the 
Archipelago’s excision from Mauritius; and they were receptive to Mauritius’ duress 
argument, too.13 In its Award, the Tribunal decided that the MPA’s creation had 
violated several of the Convention’s provisions.14 It found the material undertakings, 
contained in the 1965 ‘Agreement’, were legally binding and gave Mauritius a stake in 
certain decisions about the Archipelago’s future.15 But when subsequent bilateral 
discussions came to nothing Mauritius decided to take the matter to the General 
Assembly.  
 
6 ibid [100-107]. 
7 BIOT Order in Council (1965) SI 1965/1920. 
8 ‘Exchange of Notes between the UK and US Governments concerning the Availability for Defence 
Purposes of the British Indian Ocean Territory’, 30 Dec 1966, UKTS No 15 (1967) Cmnd 3231. 
9 Most were transported to Mauritius although some were taken to Seychelles. This prohibition was 
implemented through the 1971 BIOT Immigration Ordinance. 
10 See the ‘Report of the Select Committee on the Excision of the Chagos Archipelago (No 2/1983)’ 
(Mauritian Legislative Assembly). 
11 (1982) 1833 UNTS 39.  
12 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v UK), Award (Annex VII LOSC Tribunal, Perm Ct. 
Arb 2015). 
13 See their Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, ibid, [70-79]. 
14 Arts 2(3), 56(2), and 194(4), Award (n 12) [547]. The MPA remains in force as a matter of UK law. 
See R (Bancoult No 3) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2018) UKSC 3. 
15 Award (n 12), [535, 539-540, and 544]. 
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Mauritius drafted and tabled the Request for an Advisory Opinion, which was 
sponsored by the Group of African States. It was adopted by the General Assembly, 
without amendment.16 In essence, the Request asked the following two questions: 
was the decolonization of Mauritius completed when it gained independence in 1968, 
after the excision of the Chagos Archipelago? If not, what were the legal 
consequences flowing from the UK’s continued administration of the Archipelago? In 
order to answer the Request, the Court would need to decide how, and when, the right 
to self-determination crystallized as a matter of CIL. If such a norm had emerged 
before 1965, the UK would under an obligation to maintain Mauritius’ territorial 
integrity, pending the exercise of this right. However, if the right to self-determination 
acquired customary status after Mauritius had acceded to independence, the UK 
would have had the authority to partition the Mauritian colonial unit in 1965 (or 1968, 
at the latest) as a matter of international law. 
 
3. The Right to Self-determination and Customary International Law  
3.1. Self-determination and the UN Charter 
Article 1(2) of the UN Charter proclaimed the principle of self-determination and the 
equality of peoples to be one of the purposes of the United Nations. Further, Article 73 
recognised the ‘sacred trust’ imposed on administering States to ensure that the 
interests and well-being of the permanent inhabitants of NSGTs were of paramount 
concern. It also declared that it was incumbent on these States to develop the 
institutions of such Territories so as to bring about the progressive realization of self-
government.17 However, the exact relationship between Articles 1(2) and 73 was not 
entirely clear at this point and the extent to which these provisions demonstrated the 
existence of a legal right to self-determination remained uncertain during the UN’s 
early years.18  
 
3.2. The Significance of the Colonial Declaration  
 
16 GA Res 71/292, 22 June 2017. 
17 To this end, Art 73(e) required all administering States to report to the UN Secretary General on the 
conditions prevailing in their NSGTs. The General Assembly was quick to assume the responsibility for 
monitoring developments in these Territories: see Allen, (n 3), 139-156. 
18 However, the Court had no difficulty in finding the strong connections between these provisions and 
the subsequent the emergence of the right to self-determination. See Opinion, (n 1) [147]. 
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Mauritius’ core argument was that the right to self-determination had achieved CIL 
status with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)(1960) – the 
‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’.19 
This Declaration asserted, inter alia, that: alien subjugation, exploitation and 
domination constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights (paragraph 1); all peoples 
have the right to self-determination (paragraph 2); no fetters can be placed on the 
exercise of that right in relation to the achievement of independence (paragraph 5); 
and the disruption of the territory integrity of a ‘country’ is incompatible with the UN 
Charter (paragraph 6). Mauritius carefully traced the way in which this entitlement had 
evolved, throughout the 1950s, via the General Assembly’s work concerning 
decolonization,20 and its involvement in the drafting of the International Covenants on 
Human Rights.21 Moreover, it drew attention to the fact that General Assembly had 
applied the Colonial Declaration to the Mauritian context via resolution 
2066(XX)(1965), which was adopted a few weeks after the Archipelago’s excision from 
Mauritius. In sharp contrast, the UK argued that the right of self-determination had not 
crystallized as a CIL norm by the critical date. Specifically, it denied that resolution 
1514 generated any binding legal obligations as far as Mauritius’ decolonization was 
concerned.22 Both the UK and the US contended that the right of self-determination 
only acquired CIL status with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 
2625(XXV)(1970)) – i.e. after Mauritius had become independent.23 
General Assembly resolutions do not create international law per se as, 
formally, they only amount to institutional recommendations.24 But while the colonial 
powers have always been reluctant to interpret General Assembly resolutions as 
having some kind of quasi-legislative authority,25 it is well-established that such 
 
19 Transcript, 3 September 2018, AM, CR 2018/20, 45-47. 
20 See Mauritius’ Written Statement, 1 March 2018, 187-228. The key resolutions included: 
421(V)(1950); 545 (VI)(1952); 637A (VII)(1952); 738 (VIII)(1953); 837 (IX)(1954); 1188 (XII)(1957); and 
the Report of the Third Committee on the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights (1955) 
A/3077.  
21 The International Covenants on Human Rights were endorsed in GA Res 2200A (XXI)(1966).  
22 Transcript, 3 September 2018, PM, CR 2018/21, 48. 
23 ibid, 45. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States provided: ‘By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, 
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development […]’. 
24 Art 13, UN Charter. 
25 See, eg, Huw Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (2014) 79–81; David Harris and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, Cases and Materials on International Law (8th edn, 2015) 54. But see Brian Lepard (ed), 
Re-examining Customary International Law (2017). 
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resolutions may contribute to CIL’s development by providing evidence of opinio juris 
in certain circumstances.26 Concomitant State practice would also be needed for a 
new CIL norm to emerge, however. During the period in question, the requisite 
standard was that such practice had to be extensive and virtually uniform.27 However, 
although, prima facie, the Colonial Declaration’s provisions had a mandatory 
character, where was the necessary State practice in support of a customary right to 
self-determination? In this context, it could be argued that discrete instances of 
decolonization involved the exercise of the right to self-determination by peoples, 
rather than States, notwithstanding the fact that these events proved the existence of 
a corresponding duty to facilitate the exercise this entitlement on the part of 
administering States. It is clear that this technical obstacle could be overcome by the 
claim that State activity in connection with the adoption of General Assembly 
resolutions may qualify as State practice, in appropriate cases.28 However, this 
approach does not address the issue of the correct threshold for establishing when 
the right to self-determination crystallized as CIL norm. Was the new position 
expressed in resolution 1514, which was passed by 89 votes with none against and 9 
abstentions (largely the colonial powers) – or did this only happen with the passing of 
resolution 2625, which was adopted by consensus in 1970? 
 
3.3. Self-determination and the Principle of Inter-Temporal Law  
The claims and counterclaims made during the advisory proceedings would appear to 
turn on different readings of the principle of inter-temporal law. The principle is often 
associated with disputes about title to territory, but it underpins international legality 
and the rule of law more generally. Its first element holds that actions must be judged 
by reference to the law in force at the time they were carried out while the second 
component requires States to conduct themselves in ways that keep pace with legal 
 
26 See the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (1996), ICJ Rep 226, [70]. 
27 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and Netherlands) 
(1969) ICJ Rep 3, [77]. 
28 Conclusion 6(2) of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Conclusions on the Identification 
of Customary International Law (2018) provides that State practice may take the form of ‘conduct in 
connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization’, A/73/10. The accompanying 
Commentary acknowledges that ‘such practice contributes to the formation, or expression, of [CIL] 
rules’ [7]. This position was also taken by the International Law Association in its ‘Statement of 
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law’, (2000), 19. 
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developments as far as their (unfulfilled) international obligations are concerned.29 As 
noted above, the UK claimed that the detachment of the Chagos Islands from the 
Mauritius did not breach contemporaneous international law. The US also maintained 
this position arguing that, if the Court chose to answer the Request, the normative 
standing of the right to self-determination would have to be assessed by recourse to 
international law as it stood in 1965-1968 rather than by reference to doctrinal 
developments occurring in the intervening period.30 Mauritius argued that, in any 
event, the UK’s actions breached the applicable law of the time and, to this end, it 
claimed the idea that colonial ‘territories were simply given away out of a sense of 
noblesse oblige, unfettered by any legal obligation [was] both condescending to the 
peoples who gained their independence in that period, and legally untenable’.31 During 
the mid-1960s different perspectives certainly existed as to whether self-determination 
constituted a CIL norm (or not),32 but which view held sway at the critical date?  
For modern international lawyers, it may be almost inconceivable that the 
process of decolonization did not result from anything other than the rights and 
obligations forged by international law during the 1950s and 60s. For example, James 
Crawford submitted, as Counsel for Mauritius, in the Chagos MPA Case that:  
  
‘It’s impossible to look back to the 1960s and view what was happening as 
anything but the achievement of independence on the basis of the exercise of 
the legal right categorically affirmed by the General Assembly in 1960.’33 
 
But, from a broader perspective, it is worth asking whether decolonization progressed 
in response to the existence of a legal right to self-determination or was this entitlement 
actually a product of that process?34 Clearly, the customary right must have emerged 
at some point during the process of decolonization but if the decisive moment was 
 
29 See Judge Huber’s treatment of this principle in the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands/USA)(1928) 
2 RIAA 829, 845. 
30 Transcript, 5 September 2018, AM, CR 2018/24, 14. 
31 Transcript, 3 September 2018, AM, CR 2018/20, 47. 
32 See Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law (n 3), 176-197.  
33 Quoted in Mauritius’ Written Statement, 1 March 2018, 211. But see James Crawford, ‘The General 
Assembly, the International Court and Self-determination’ in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
(eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (1996) 
585.  
34 James Summers, ‘Decolonisation Revisited and the Obligation Not to Divide a Non-Self-Governing 
Territory’, (2018) 55 Questions in International Law 147, 156-7.  
8 
 
reached in 1970 with the adoption of resolution 2625, it would follow that the right only 
acquired its binding quality just when that process was coming to an end.35  
A number of participants argued that self-determination had achieved the status 
of jus cogens by 1965.36 Cyprus, however, contended that the temporal dimension of 
the case was largely irrelevant since the UK’s failure to complete Mauritius’ 
decolonization meant that its outstanding obligation was subject to normative 
developments which had occurred in the ensuing years.37 In this respect, Cyprus 
showed that the second element of the principle of inter-temporal law had profound 
implications for the advisory proceedings because even pre-existing treaty norms 
would be overtaken by emergence of new jus cogens.38 This observation is particularly 
acute in the context of the Chagos Archipelago given the 1966 UK/US Agreement 
concerning the use of Diego Garcia for defence purposes.  
In any event, the act of interpretation alone would have a significant impact on 
the way in which the key sources were understood during the advisory proceedings. 
The UK and US’s insistence that the Court should approach the case as though it was 
conducting the proceedings in 1968 assumes that even if the pivotal General 
Assembly resolutions had been adopted by then, any interpretation of international 
law would have to be consistent with the way in which the material international legal 
doctrines were understood by judges and international lawyers practising at that 
time.39 There is no way of knowing for sure that the ICJ would have answered the first 
question posed in the Request in the negative, if the case had been heard back in 
1968. We only have to look at its 1966 decision in the South-West Africa Case to be 
reminded that such an outcome would not have been a foregone conclusion.40 There 
is no way back to that time – a time when certain voices were heard and others were 
not – but we cannot lose sight of the fact that those involved in the advisory 
proceedings in 2018 would, inevitably, be interpreting the relevant rules and principles 
 
35 Mauritius’ argument in Chagos MPA Case, cited by Guatemala, Transcript, 5 September 2018, AM, 
CR 2018/24, 35. 
36 See eg South Africa, Transcript, 4 September 2018, AM, CR 2018/22, 14. Mauritius proclaimed self-
determination’s peremptory character. However, it did not allege that this status had been attained by 
1965-68: Written Statement, 1 March 2018, 211. 
37 Transcript, 4 September 2018, PM, CR 2018/23, 55-57. 
38 ibid. See Arts 53 and 64, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
39 See Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Sematic Change and Normative 
Twists (2012); and Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in 
International Law (2015).  
40 South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa and Liberia v South Africa)(Second Phase)(1966) ICJ Rep 
6. 
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of international law in the light of progressive developments, which have occurred over 
the last fifty years. 
In relation to the Assembly’s second question – what are the consequences of 
detachment for the UK’s ongoing administration of the Chagos Islands? – Mauritius 
argued that the UK’s excision of the Chagos Islands from the Mauritius amounts to a 
continuing breach of international law and it bears responsibility for its internationally 
wrongful acts.41 Consequently, it claimed that the right result would be for the 
Archipelago to be returned immediately (or at least within six months).42 Nonetheless, 
Mauritius was careful not to set out the full ramifications of this question. It would follow 
that, if the UK’s responsibility was triggered in 1965, when the BIOT was founded, the 
extent of the UK’s wrongdoing would be considerable, and, in contentious 
proceedings, it would certainly give rise to a hefty claim for reparations. However, 
Mauritius held back on this potential claim, perhaps to avoid the possibility that the 
dispute might be characterized as a bilateral one otherwise.43 
  
3.4. Uti Possidetis Juris and Title to Territory 
One of the main difficulties for Mauritius flowed from its claim that the advisory 
proceedings were about enabling the General Assembly to satisfy its mandate to bring 
about the end of decolonization in a specific context. As a result, Mauritius had to avoid 
any arguments that would create the impression that this was really a bilateral dispute 
about territorial sovereignty. Consequently, it chose to argue that the case had nothing 
to do with title to territory.44 It is notable that Mauritius invoked the principle of uti 
possidetis juris in pleadings in the Chagos MPA Case.45 However, in its Written 
Statement in the advisory proceedings, it argued that colonial units were protected by 
the right of self-determination via an associated entitlement to territorial integrity.46 
And, by the time of the oral proceedings, it had further clarified its position and was 
 
41 Transcript, 3 September 2018, AM, CR 2018/20, p 65. See Art 14 of the ILC’s Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) (ARSIWA). 
42 Transcript, ibid, 63. 
43 However, a number of participants in the proceedings raised the issue of reparations and see the 
Separate Opinions of Judges Trindade and Sebutinde. 
44 Transcript, 3 September 2018 AM, CR 2018/20, 78 and 80. 
45 Mauritius’ 2012 Memorial in the Chagos MPA Case, 108-109. According to Shaw, the customary 
principle of uti possidetis juris creates a strong presumption that, ‘new States will come to independence 
with the same boundaries they had when they were administrative units within the territory or territories 
of a colonial power’: Malcolm Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’, 
(1996) 67 British Yearbook of International Law 75, 97. 
46 Mauritius’ Written Statement, 1 March 2018, 216-219. 
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arguing that a right to territorial integrity was a corollary of the right to self-
determination.47 Mauritius’ claim that the issue of self-determination could be 
separated from the question of title to territory is hard to understand, at least at first 
glance. At one level, the exercise of the right to external self-determination always has 
territorial consequences. However, Mauritius’ way around this difficulty was to argue 
that any apparent bilateral dispute concerning territorial sovereignty was located in a 
broader frame of reference – decolonization – a process in which the General 
Assembly has performed a leading role.48 It reasoned that once the process of 
decolonization has been completed, by the return of the Chagos Islands, no dispute 
would remain outstanding.49  
As far as the principle of uti possidetis juris is concerned, in the Frontier Dispute 
(Burkina Faso/Mali) Case, the ICJ observed that: 
 
‘[…] International law – and consequently the principle of uti possidetis – applies 
to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive effect, but immediately and 
from that moment onwards. It applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the 
‘photograph’ of the territorial situation then existing. The principle of uti 
possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not put back 
the hands […]’50 
 
This standpoint led the UK to argue that it was only the exact moment of independence 
that mattered for the purpose of decolonization and, consequently, a colonial power 
was entitled to alter the territorial parameters of the colonial unit at any time prior to 
the achievement of independence.51 The UK’s argument overlooked one of the main 
justifications for adopting this principle in relation to Africa’s decolonization – the 
perceived need to maintain international stability and to obviate ‘fratricidal struggles’ 
during the process of decolonization by discouraging irredentist claims.52 Accordingly, 
it could not be construed as a momentary phenomenon. Moreover, in the light of its 
core purpose, the principle could not be used to support the idea that administering 
powers would be competent to dismember their colonial territories on the eve of 
 
47 A construction that was consistent with the one advanced by Belize in this case. See Transcript, 4 
September 2018, AM, CR 2018/23, 23. Also see Belize’s Written Statement, 30 January 2018, 20-29. 
48 For discussion of this concept see Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (1975) ICJ Rep 12, [32-33]. 
49 See Mauritius’ Written Comments, 18 May 2018, 38-39. This view was echoed by the African Union, 
Transcript, 6 September 2018, PM, CR 2018/27, 19. 
50 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Case (1986) ICJ Rep 566, [30]. 
51 Transcript, 3 September 2018, PM, CR 2018/21, 42. 
52 Frontier Dispute Case, (n 50), [20]. 
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independence, particularly where such a step would involve the creation of a new 
colony. 
 
4. The Chagos Advisory Opinion  
In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ ruled that the adoption of resolution 1514 was: ‘a 
defining moment in the consolidation of State practice on decolonization’, and, thus, 
in the evolution of the customary right to self-determination.53 The Court saw the 
Declaration as the catalyst for the acceleration of the process of decolonization in the 
years immediately following its adoption. As far as the opinio juris requirement was 
concerned, the ICJ was convinced that, both in terms of its content and the 
circumstances of its adoption, resolution 1514 had ‘a declaratory character with regard 
to self-determination as a customary norm’, which was reflected in its key provisions.54 
The Court also arrived at the conclusion that the subject of the right to self-
determination – the ‘people’ concerned – was to be defined by reference to a NSGT 
as a whole and the customary right to territorial integrity was the corollary of the wider 
entitlement to self-determination, by virtue of paragraph 6 of the Colonial 
Declaration.55 Invoking the formulation it had articulated in the Western Sahara Case, 
the Court observed that, after 1960, the partitioning of such a Territory would violate 
the right to self-determination, ‘unless it is based on the freely expressed and genuine 
will of the people of the territory concerned’.56 Further, it observed that a high level of 
scrutiny was required for the purpose of assessing whether consent had actually been 
given.57 Applying this test to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 1965 
‘Agreement’, the ICJ found that, under the 1964 Mauritian constitution, the elected 
Mauritian representatives did not possess the authority to agree to the Archipelago’s 
detachment.58 In effect, the Court held that consent could only have been obtained 
through a referendum held before the decision was made. It, therefore, reached the 
conclusion that Mauritius’ decolonization had not been lawfully completed in 1968.59 
 
53 Chagos Opinion (n 1), [150]. 
54 Opinion, [152-3]. 
55 Opinion, [160].  
56 Opinion, [150-153]. See the Western Sahara Opinion (n 48), [59]. 
57 Chagos Opinion (n 1), [172]. 
58 ibid. This conclusion was based on the Committee of Twenty-Four’s assessment that real power 
remained with the UK government during this period: Opinion, [99]. 
59 Opinion, [174]. 
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The issues of territorial integrity and consent are analysed further in the following 
article by Robert McCorquodale Jennifer Robinson and Nicola Peart.  
In response to the Request’s second question, the Court decided that the UK’s 
continuing administration of the Chagos Islands constituted an international wrongful 
act for which it bears responsibility.60 The jurisprudence of self-determination 
reasserted itself at this point as the ICJ reaffirmed its view that self-determination 
manifests an erga omnes character.61 To this end, it chose to invoke resolution 2625, 
which declared that all States are under a duty to co-operate with the UN regarding 
the realization of the right to self-determination.62 However, the Opinion stopped short 
of holding that self-determination has attained the status of jus cogens. Beyond calling 
on the UK to withdraw from the Archipelago as rapidly as possible, the ICJ left the 
modalities for the completion of Mauritius’ decolonization to the General Assembly.63  
The Court relied virtually exclusively on CIL in its Advisory Opinion. However, 
given the numerous submissions in the advisory proceedings about self-
determination’s peremptory character, how could this apparent status (and the 
consequences thereof) be ignored? A well-rehearsed argument in this regard is that 
self-determination does not have the normative clarity required for peremptory status, 
when compared with norms such as, say, torture or genocide.64 However, it could be 
retorted that a prohibition on the dismemberment of a colonial territory on the eve of 
the exercise of the right to self-determination without the genuine consent of the 
people concerned has a high degree of specificity and, thus, it should be capable of 
qualifying as jus cogens.  
A number of judges addressed the issue of jus cogens in their Separate 
Opinions. Perhaps the most incisive analysis in this respect was undertaken by Judge 
Robinson who set out a scheme by which norms could be shown to have acquired 
peremptory status.65 He reasoned that self-determination was a CIL norm before 1960 
as a result of the General Assembly’s activity between 1950 and 1957; that it was 
 
60 Opinion, [177] (13 votes to 1). 
61 Opinion, [180]. See the East Timor (Portugal v Australia) Case (1995) ICJ Rep 102, [29]. 
62 GA Res 2625(XXV)(1970). 
63 Chagos Opinion (n 1), [178-179]. 
64 See eg Jamie Trinidad, Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories (2018) 13-16.  
65 Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, [77]. According to his key criteria a customary norm could 
graduate to jus cogens if it: (a) has been recognised and accepted by States as a whole without the 
need for a corresponding conventional obligation having been established; (b) has a moral and 
humanitarian character; (c) protects the fundamental values of the international community; and (d) has 
universal application. 
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grounded in the obligation to respect the inherent dignity and worth of the human 
condition; and he alluded to the widely held belief that the recognition of the right to 
self-determination is a precursor for the existence of all human rights.66 He went on to 
identify the evidence in support of his view that self-determination had attained 
peremptory status by the critical date.67 For Judge Robinson, the upshot of this 
analysis was that the 1966 UK/US treaty concerning Diego Garcia violated the terms 
of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and, therefore, 
it must be considered to be null and void.68 Moreover, he observed that such a 
conclusion should trigger a duty of non-recognition on all States, as far as the illegal 
situation in the Chagos Archipelago is concerned.69  
Perhaps the Court’s reticence on this issue is understandable as the CIL route 
was one that was at least plausible to all those participating in the proceedings and it 
was sufficient for the purpose of responding to the Assembly’s Request. However, this 
approach meant that the continued operation of the US military base on Diego Garcia 
was not held to violate international law.70 Surprisingly, during the proceedings, 
Mauritius gave an undertaking to support the continued operation of the US once the 
Archipelago was returned.71 It is not clear how such an undertaking is consistent with 
its claim that self-determination manifests a peremptory character, especially when 
taking into account Cyprus’ argument on this point. It may be that Mauritius’ decision 
was dictated by pragmatism but as the Chagos debacle was driven by real-politick 
considerations right from the start, it would be hard to justify this strategy on that basis. 
Moreover, such a course of action begs the question, how could this small Archipelago 
be resettled in any meaningful sense with a US military base sprawled across its 
largest island?72  
 
 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid, [71-73]. This account was assisted by the conclusion that the right to self-determination had 
entered into custom by 1957, as a result of a series of resolutions which had been adopted between 
1950 and 1957, [6-17]: see (n 20).  
68 ibid, [83 and 88].  
69 ibid, [89]. This view was also shared by Judge Trindade in his Separate Opinion. See Arts 40 and 
41(2), ARSIWA. In any event, States would be under a duty not to knowingly assist the UK in 
perpetuating its internationally wrongful act via Art 16. 
70 Judge Tomka observed, in his Separate Opinion, that the Court was silent about this matter, [10]. 
71 Transcript, 3 September 2018, AM, CR 2018/20, 70. 
72 A study, sponsored by the UK government, concluded that resettlement was feasible: see R (on the 
Application of Hoareau and Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] 
EWHC 221 (Admin) [36-51]. However, this assessment was based on continued observance of the 
UK’s treaty obligations to the US. Mauritius would not be bound by any such commitments.     
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5. Self-determination and the Chagossians  
5.1. The Special Position of the Chagossians in the Advisory Proceedings 
The special position of the Chagossians, as far as the advisory proceedings were 
concerned, is obvious. Mauritius positioned the Chagossians at the heart of its case. 
This was apparent from the Assembly’s second question, which focused on the 
consequences of the UK’s ongoing administration of the Archipelago: ‘including with 
respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on 
the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin’. 
Further, the moving video testimony of Liseby Elyse, a Chagossian who was removed 
involuntarily from the Archipelago, was offered as a ‘statement of impact’.73 And a 
number of Chagossian political leaders were members of the Mauritian delegation, 
including Olivier Bancoult, Chair of the Chagos Refugees Group. Clearly, the UK 
government’s well-documented callous disregard for the Archipelago’s permanent 
inhabitants provides a glimpse of the massive human cost caused by the exiling of the 
Chagossians from their ancestral homeland. The plight of the Chagossians has 
remained a mainstay of the Mauritian government’s narrative in the aftermath of the 
Advisory Opinion.74 However, it is worth remembering that many Chagossians 
continue to experience chronic impoverishment in Mauritius and they have largely 
remained at the bottom of Mauritian society since their arrival on the island all those 
years ago.75 
The centrality of the Chagossians’ communal experience to Mauritius’ case 
may have prompted a question asked by Judge Gaya at the end of Mauritius’ oral 
submissions on the first morning of the proceedings. He asked: ‘In the process of 
decolonisation relating to the Chagos Archipelago, what is the relevance of the will of 
the population of Chagossian origin?’. Mauritius responded by saying that the 
administering Power was required to take the will of the Chagossian population into 
account ‘in determining whether the consent of the people of Mauritius as a whole has 
been obtained’.76 It added that:  
 
73 Counsel for Mauritius, ibid, 72.  
74 In the General Assembly, the Mauritian Prime Minister said the treatment meted out to the 
Chagossians by the UK ‘was akin to a crime against humanity’: GA/12146, 22 May 2019.  
75 See David Vine, ‘The Impoverishment of Displacement: Models for Documenting Human Rights 
Abuses and the People of Diego Garcia’ (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief 21. 
76 Mauritius’ Written Reply to Judge Gaya’s Question, [5]. 
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‘The withdrawal of the unlawful administration, the recognition of the territorial 
integrity of Mauritius as including the Chagos Archipelago and the exercise of 
sovereignty over the totality of its territory by Mauritius, will allow the return to 
the Chagos Archipelago, and the resettlement there of all individual 
Chagossians wishing to do so, in accordance with the laws of Mauritius’.77  
  
The UK observed that Mauritius had addressed the issue of resettlement only in 
relation to its own nationals and it pointed out that significant Chagossian communities 
are located in the Seychelles and the UK.78 Mauritius would surely reply that all those 
of Chagossian origin (and their direct descendants) are, in principle, eligible for 
Mauritian citizenship. However, such a standpoint would not necessarily satisfy the 
now sizeable Chagossian diaspora.79  
In its Advisory Opinion, the Court catalogued the situation of the Chagossians 
in some detail.80 However, it did not want to rule on their human rights. Instead, it noted 
that:  
 
‘As regards the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of Mauritian nationals, 
including those of Chagossian origin, this is an issue relating to the protection 
of the human rights of those concerned, which should be addressed by the 
General Assembly during the completion of the decolonization of Mauritius.’81  
 
This position is entirely consistent with the statist character of the international legal 
order; however, given the pivotal role the suffering of the Chagossians played in the 
narratives weaved by the participants in the advisory proceedings, it was disappointing 
that the Court declined to provide more guidance on how the human rights of the 
Chagossians might be protected on the Archipelago’s return to Mauritius.  
The UK government’s initial response to the Advisory Opinion has not been 
positive.82 Given that the UK and US hold veto powers in the Security Council, the 
 
77 ibid, [6]. 
78 The UK’s Comments on the Mauritius’ Written Reply, [5 and 8]. Also see the US’s Comments [4]. 
79 See Laura Jeffery, Chagos Islanders in Mauritius and the UK (2011). 
80 Chagos Opinion (n 1), [113-130]. 
81 Opinion, [181]. 
82 See the statement of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, House of Commons, 26 February 2019 
and the views expressed by the UK’s representative in the General Assembly, 22 May 2019, GA/12146. 
Also see Thomas Burri, ‘In the Wake of the ICJ’s Opinion in Chagos: Britannia Waives the 
Rules’, Völkerrechtsblog, 9 July 2019: https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/in-the-wake-of-the-icjs-opinion-in-
chagos-britannia-waives-the-rules/. 
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General Assembly will have to take the lead in operationalizing the ICJ’s findings in 
this case. Against this background, on 22 May 2019, the General Assembly adopted 
a resolution welcoming the Chagos Advisory Opinion while taking several steps 
designed to give it effect. For instance, the Assembly demanded, inter alia, that: the 
UK withdraw its administration within 6 months; the resettlement of the Chagos 
Archipelago by Mauritian nationals (including those of Chagossian origin) must be 
addressed urgently; and the UK was urged to co-operate with Mauritius to facilitate 
this process.83 However, the Assembly chose not to elaborate on the content of the 
Chagossians’ rights vis-à-vis the Archipelago on this occasion, instead it appeared to 
leave this matter to Mauritius. Whether such a light-touch approach is fully justified 
remains an open question, especially in the light of Judge Tomka’s critical observation 
that the Chagossians: ‘were not represented in – and defended vigorously enough by 
– the Government of Mauritius [and] they were in fact abandoned by the United 
Nations, which, after 1968, was not interested in their destiny […]’.84  
In their Separate Opinions, Judges Gaja and Abraham contemplated the 
importance of the will of the Chagossians in the context of Mauritius’ decolonization. 
Specifically, they took the view that the ICJ should have stopped with its finding that 
Mauritius’ decolonization had not been lawfully completed rather than ruling on the 
final status of the Chagos Islands. Judge Gaja did not share the Court’s view that the 
principle of territorial integrity requires the whole colonial territory to be attributed to a 
single independent State.85 He observed that while the Assembly may wish to reaffirm 
the view it took back in the 1960s – that the Chagos Islands would become part of 
Mauritius – he noted that the Assembly possessed a measure of discretion regarding 
the shape that decolonization took in concrete cases,86 and so it should have been left 
to the Assembly to revisit this issue taking into consideration the freely expressed will 
of the Chagossians, and their descendants, today.87 Judge Abraham recognised that 
different sub-units of the same colony could express different preferences with regard 
to decolonization. He concluded that, as long as such views were freely expressed, a 
colonial power would not be violating the principle of territorial integrity if it put in place 
 
83 GA Res 73/295, 22 May 2019. It also called on all States to co-operate with the UN and to refrain 
from any action that would impede or delay the decolonization of Mauritius. The voting record was 116 
in favour and 6 against, with 56 abstentions. 
84 Judge Tomka, Separate Opinion, [1].  
85 Judge Gaya, Separate Opinion, [1]. 
86 Ibid, [5]. This discretion was acknowledged in the Western Sahara Opinion (n 48), [71]. 
87 Judge Gaya’s Separate Opinion, ibid [6].  
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different arrangements for the decolonization of individual sub-units, irrespective of the 
fact that this approach may give effect to decisions reached by minority populations.88 
Judge Abraham noted that the Chagossians were not consulted by the UK during the 
process of detachment; nevertheless, he considered that their views would have been 
significant at that point regarding the fate of the Chagos Archipelago.89  
There is considerable anthropological evidence to suggest that the 
Chagossians possess a societal/cultural identity that separates them from the wider 
Mauritian people.90 In this context, it may be significant that, in Re Secession of 
Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court observed that the notion of a ‘people’ is not 
necessarily co-terminus with the entire population of a given State.91 Indeed, in that 
case, the Court observed that a ‘people’ may include only a portion of the population 
of an existing State in relation to the exercise of the right to self-determination.92 
Against this background, it is worth noting that Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples declares that Indigenous peoples possess the right to 
self-determination.93 The Chagossians have embraced their status as an Indigenous 
people and, as a result, their entitlement to an array of Indigenous-specific rights 
should be recognized in relation to the resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago.94 
However, the extent to which the Mauritian government will be receptive to any such 
claim-rights, which arise as a matter of CIL,95 remains to be seen.  
  
5.2. The Effect of the Chagos Advisory Opinion on the Bancoult Litigation 
 
88 Judge Abraham’s Separate Opinion. This analysis may have been prompted by the controversial 
arrangements devised for Mayotte in the Comoros Archipelago. See Jamie Trinidad, ‘Self-
Determination and Territorial Integrity in the Chagos Advisory Proceedings: Potential Broader 
Ramifications’ (2018) 55 Questions in International Law 61, 65-67. 
89 ibid, Separate Opinion. 
90 See Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law (n 3), 271-282; and Amy Schwebel, 
‘International Law and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: What Next for the Chagossians’, in Allen and 
Monaghan, Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives (n 3), 319. 
91 [1998] 2 SCR 217. 
92 ibid, [124]. 
93 GA Res 61/295 (2007). However, the Indigenous specific variant of this entitlement does not give rise 
to a presumptive right to independent statehood. 
94 The Mauritian government has objected to the Chagossians’ claim of indigeneity saying that they 
constituted a segment of the wider Mauritian people. See Report of the 17th session of the UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, 12 August 1999, E/CN4/Sub2/1999/19 [63]. South Africa referred to 
the Chagossians as an Indigenous people during the advisory proceedings. Transcript, 4 September 
2018, PM, CR 2018/22, 13. 
95 See eg Siegfried Wiessner ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1141; and 
Matthias Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System (2016).  
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The significance of the Chagos Advisory Opinion for the Chagossians’ ongoing 
litigation in the UK courts has been raised in the context of the outstanding appeal in 
R (on the Application of Hoareau and Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs.96 These joined cases sought to challenge to the decision, 
taken in 2016, not to allow the Chagos Islands to be resettled and/or to provide public 
funding for this purpose. Although the Divisional Court dismissed them, the Court of 
Appeal subsequently granted to leave to appeal against its decision.97 One of the 
grounds on which permission to appeal was granted addressed the ramifications of 
the Chagos Advisory Opinion for the European Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR) 
application to the BIOT/Chagos Archipelago.98 The key issue here is whether the 
approach followed by the Strasbourg Court, in its 2012 decision in Chagos Islanders 
v UK can be re-evaluated as far as the applicability of Article 56 of the ECHR to the 
BIOT/Chagos Archipelago is concerned.99 
Article 1 of the ECHR provides that: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention’. According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
on the issue of jurisdiction, the Convention will be engaged if a Contracting State is 
exercising governmental authority in a particular setting and either: (i) its agents have 
authority and control over an affected individual;100 or (ii) it exercises effective control 
over the area in question.101 However, developments concerning the jurisdictional 
scope of Article 1 seem to have had no discernible impact on the interpretation of the 
colonial application clause contained in Article 56 (formerly Article 63). Specifically, 
Article 56(1) allows a Contracting State to extend the Convention to one or more of its 
Overseas Territories Indeed, the operation of Article 56 has been held to be ‘clearly 
separate and distinct’ from jurisdiction exercised under Article 1.102 In recent years, 
the Strasbourg Court’s consistent position has been that the Convention cannot apply 
in the absence of a positive declaration extending it to such a Territory. This 
differentiated approach has led to strange outcomes. For instance, in Al Skeini v UK, 
 
96 See (n 72). 
97 [2019] EWCA Civ 1254. 
98 ibid, [2].  
99 (2013) 56 EHRR SE15. 
100 Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 44 EHRR SE5, [71]; and Al-Skeini v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 18, [136-7]. 
101 Bankovic, ibid [71]; Al-Skeini, ibid, [138-139]; and Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 
20 EHRR 99, [75]. 
102 Al Skeini, ibid, [140]; and Chagos Islanders v UK, (n 99), [73]. 
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the UK’s jurisdiction was held to be engaged, under Article 1, in connection with its 
military occupation of southern Iraq. In contrast, in Chagos Islanders v UK,103 the 
ECHR was found to be inapplicable to the BIOT, a Territory over which the UK was 
assumed to exercise sovereign authority, because it had chosen not to extend the 
Convention there, in accordance with the terms of Article 56. This admissibility 
decision followed the approach the Court had devised in Quark Fishing Company v 
UK,104 where it had ruled that Protocol 1 to the Convention did not apply to South 
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, a British Overseas Territory, on the basis 
that it had not been expressly extended to that Territory, under Article 4(1) of that 
Protocol.105  
However, in the light of the Chagos Advisory Opinion, Article 56 should now be 
treated as being inapplicable to the BIOT with the outcome that the UK’s jurisdiction 
is engaged vis-à-vis this Territory by reference to Article 1 of the ECHR via the 
‘effective control of an area’ test endorsed in Al Skeini. Such an approach may be 
justified by the ICJ’s finding that self-determination generates erga omnes obligations 
for third States and international community more generally.106 To this end, it is worth 
noting that Article 56(1) allows: 
  
‘Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any time thereafter declare by 
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the 
present Convention shall, subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or 
any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible.’107 
 
The key question, as far as the ECHR’s application to the BIOT is concerned, is this – 
if the UK’s continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago is unlawful as a matter 
of CIL, then how can the UK be treated as being responsible for the Territory’s 
international relations, pursuant to Article 56? The Chagos Advisory Opinion provides 
the necessary authority in support of the argument that the UK is not responsible for 
the Territory’s international relations because it does not exercise sovereign authority 
over the Chagos Archipelago as a matter of international law.  
 
103 Chagos Islanders v UK, ibid, [65-75]). 
104 (2007) 44 EHRR SE4. 
105 The terms of Art 4 of Protocol 1 are comparable to Art 56(1). 
106 Chagos Opinion (n 1), [180]. 
107 Emphasis added. 
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Moreover, the Strasbourg Court itself has previously acknowledged there might 
be cases where the status of an Overseas Territory may be disputed as far as the 
applicability of Article 56 is concerned. For example, in Quark Fishing Company v UK, 
the Court stated that:  
 
‘Since there is no dispute as to the status of South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands as a territory for whose international relations the United 
Kingdom is responsible within the meaning of Article 56, the Court finds that the 
Convention and Protocol cannot apply unless expressly extended by 
declaration […].’108  
 
The argument that Article 56 is inapplicable to the BIOT, and that any exercise of 
jurisdiction over the Chagos Archipelago must be governed by Article 1, is an 
irresistible one. This conclusion is reinforced by the terms of Article 31(3()(c) of the 
VCLT, which provides that treaty provisions shall be interpreted in a manner that takes 
into account any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. 
Consequently, the UK courts would be bound to rule on the implications of the Chagos 
Advisory Opinion for the current Hoareau/Bancoult appeal.109 And, ultimately, the 
Strasbourg Court itself would be bound to give effect to the ICJ’s rulings, if required.110  
 
6. Conclusion 
In its Chagos Advisory Opinion the Court delivered surprisingly robust responses to 
the questions posed in the Assembly’s Request. The Opinion, and the Separate 
Opinions which accompanied it, have significantly elaborated on the content and 
scope of the customary right to self-determination in relation to situations of 
decolonization. While the main Opinion may be seen as something of a missed 
opportunity, as far as the consolidation of the category of jus cogens is concerned, 
several of the Separate Opinions made valuable contributions to the development of 
self-determination’s peremptory character. The Court also bolstered the Assembly’s 
 
108 Quark Fishing (n 104), [73]. 
109 However, a UK court would have to consider the constitutional implications of CIL on this point. See 
R v Margaret Jones [2007] 1 AC 136. Moreover, it may have to rule on the validity of any attempt by 
the UK government to certify that the BIOT constitutes a British Overseas Territory. See Christian v The 
Queen [2007] 2 AC 400, [9-10] (Lord Hoffmann); and The Fagernes [1927] P 311, 324 (Atkin LJ).  
110 Moreover, the Advisory Opinion could also be used to overcome the European Court’s finding that 
the Chagossians could not qualify as victims for the purpose of the Convention’s application, under Art 
34, because the vast majority had settled their claims and received compensation through the 1982 
Mauritius-UK Agreement: Chagos Islanders v UK (n 99), [81]. 
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authority to take the lead in resolving this case. From its actions to date, the Assembly 
is clearly intent on bringing about Mauritius’ decolonization. In this respect, the 
interests of Mauritius and the Chagossians are closely aligned but they are not 
identical. Mauritius has focused largely on securing sovereignty over the Archipelago 
while the Chagossians have been more concerned with the right of abode and 
resettlement. Although the collective suffering of the Chagossians played a crucial role 
in the narratives offered by participants during the advisory proceedings, greater 
attention needs to be paid to the protection of their rights and interests as the pressure 
mounts on the UK to withdraw from the Archipelago. 
